In a combinatorial auction (see, for example, [5, 6] ), there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items. The VCG mechanism [7, 1, 3] is the canonical payment scheme for motivating the bidders to bid truthfully in combinatorial auctions (and variants such as combinatorial reverse auctions and combinatorial exchanges). If the setting is general enough, under some requirements, it is in fact the only one [2, 4, 8] . Unfortunately, it also introduces many problems. We focus on the related problems of revenue guarantees and bidder collusion. The existence of such problems is known by many; we lay out their full extent.
OVERVIEW
In a combinatorial auction (see, for example, [5, 6] ), there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items. The VCG mechanism [7, 1, 3] is the canonical payment scheme for motivating the bidders to bid truthfully in combinatorial auctions (and variants such as combinatorial reverse auctions and combinatorial exchanges). If the setting is general enough, under some requirements, it is in fact the only one [2, 4, 8] . Unfortunately, it also introduces many problems. We focus on the related problems of revenue guarantees and bidder collusion. The existence of such problems is known by many; we lay out their full extent.
We study four settings: combinatorial forward auctions with free disposal, combinatorial reverse auctions with free disposal, combinatorial forward (or reverse) auctions without free disposal, and combinatorial exchanges. In each setting, we give an example of how additional bidders (colluders) can make the outcome much worse (less revenue or higher cost) under the VCG payment scheme (but not under a first-price scheme). We then derive necessary and sufficient conditions for such an effective collusion to be possible under the VCG payment scheme. We also study the computational complexity of deciding whether these conditions hold. This problem is of interest both to the auctioneer, for the purpose of coming up with a revenue guarantee based on a subset of the bids that she knows; as well as to colluding bidders, for the purpose of deciding how to bid most effectively given the noncolluders' bids. Hardness of this problem is undesirable because of the first purpose, but desirable because of the second purpose.
FORWARD AUCTIONS
In a combinatorial auction, there is a set of items I = {1, 2, . . . , m} for sale. A bid takes the form b = (B, v), where B ⊆ I and v ∈ . The clearing problem is to label bids as acceped or rejected, to maximize the sum of the values of the accepted bids, under the constraint that no item occurs in more than one accepted bid. (This is assuming free disposal, that is, items do not have to be allocated to anyone.) The following proposition shows how the VCG payment scheme may fail in this setting. The next theorem characterizes the settings where the colluders can receive all the items for free.
Proposition 1. In a forward auction (even with only 2 items), there exists a family of instances (sets of bids

Theorem 1. The colluders can receive all the items for free if and only if it is possible to divide the items among the colluders in such a way that for any (nonzero) bid by a noncolluder, the items in that bid are spread across at least two colluders.
Determining whether this condition holds corresponds to the following computational problem.
Definition 1 (DIVIDE-SUBSETS).
Suppose we are given a set S, as well as a collection subsets of it, R = {S1, . . . , Sq}. We are asked whether S can be partitioned into n parts T1, T2, . . . , Tn so that no subset Si ∈ R is contained in one of these parts.
Theorem 2. DIVIDE-SUBSETS is NP-complete, even
when n = 2.
REVERSE AUCTIONS
In a combinatorial reverse auction, there is a set of items I = {1, 2, . . . , m} to be procured. A bid takes the form b = (B, v), where B ⊆ I and v ∈ . The clearing problem is to label bids as acceped or rejected, to minimize the sum of the values of the accepted bids, under the constraint that each item occurs in at least one accepted bid. 
Definition 2 (CRITICAL-PARTITION). We are given a set of items S, a collection of bids (Si, vi) where Si ⊆ S and vi ∈ , and a number n. Say that the cost of a subset of these bids is the sum of their vi; and that the cost c(T ) of a subset T ⊆ S is the lowest cost of any subset of the bids whose Si cover T . We are asked whether there exists a partition of S into n disjoint subsets T1, T2, . . . , Tn, such that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, c(Ti) = c(S).
Theorem 4. Even when the bids are so that a partition T1, . . . , Tn is a solution if and only if no set S − Ti covers all items in a bid, CRITICAL-PARTITION is NP-complete (even with n = 2).
FORWARD OR REVERSE AUCTIONS WITHOUT FREE DISPOSAL
A combinatorial forward auction without free disposal is exactly the same as one with free disposal, with the exception that every item must be allocated to some bidder. By changing the signs of the values of the bids, we can also model a combinatorial reverse auction without free disposal (where every item can be procured only once) as a combinatorial forward auction without free disposal. (This requires that bids with negative values are allowed.) 
EXCHANGES
In a combinatorial exchange, there is a set of items I = {1, 2, . . . , m} that can be traded. A bid takes the form b = (λ1, . . . , λm, v), where λ1, . . . , λm, v ∈ (possibly negative). The clearing problem is to label bids as acceped or rejected, so that the sum of the accepted vectors has its first m entries ≤ 0, to maximize the last entry of the sum of the accepted vectors. (This is assuming free disposal.) 
